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Employment Concentration and Resource Allocation: 
One-Company Towns in Russia 
 
The paper looks at the effects of employment concentration on resource allocation with a 
particular focus on one-company towns in Russia defined as towns where a single company 
accounts for a significant share of total employment of the locality. Empirical analysis of firms’ 
production functions indicates that companies located in one-company towns are 
characterised by lower marginal product of labour, higher marginal product of capital and 
lower overall productivity pointing towards significant labour hoarding. One-company town 
enterprises are also found to be financially more vulnerable. The paper argues that the 
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I. Introduction  
Russia is an economy dominated by natural resources. Despite stated policy objectives of 
diversification, this dominance has actually increased over the past twenty years (Guriev, 
Plekhanov and Sonin, 2009).1 This can be attributed to the boom in natural resource 
prices in the 2000s and to the resource allocations that have accompanied that boom. In 
this paper, we look at a related—but less acknowledged—feature of the Russian 
economy: its legacy of concentration in employment. We argue that the dominance of 
natural resources and employment concentration is in fact quite closely linked, with the 
latter affecting the composition of natural resource revenue spending.  
Although extractive industries now account for only around 11% of total value added in 
Russia, their true contribution is actually far higher. As much as 60% of industrial 
production is concentrated in related sectors, such as refining or fertilisers, while a 
significant share of value added in services is accounted for by trade in natural resources 
and trans-shipment of oil, gas and minerals (Kuboniwa, Tabata and Ustinova, 2005; 
World Bank, 2004). Their weight in general government revenues is over 35% and 
around 55% of federal government revenues. While exports have shifted away from other 
CIS countries towards the EU-15, the composition of Russia’s export basket has 
remained largely unchanged since the mid-1990s with oil and gas exports continuing to 
dominate to all regions. As such, most economic activity is concentrated in the periphery 
of the product space —mainly in hydrocarbons (Hausmann and Klinger, 2007). 
Interestingly, while extractive industries only directly account for 1.5% of total 
employment; their weight in value added is many multiples that of employment. 
The growth in the relative size of the natural resource sector might have been expected as 
the restructuring of non-resource-based Soviet-era firms and industries has played out, 
but the scale of shift and its apparent persistence requires explaining. In this paper we 
argue that part of the explanation can be traced to the way in which the inherited 
composition and location of output has had an impact on policy. In particular, we argue 
                                                 
1 The Soviet Union had a seemingly well diversified economy with manufacturing accounting for over 20% 
of total output in the 1980s. Yet much of what were notionally non-natural resources tradables were 
actually only tradable within the CMEA.   3
that concentration in employment has been an important influence on policy by 
accentuating the impact on relative prices driven by a sharp appreciation in the real 
exchange rate through the composition of spending. This reflects the underlying 
sensitivity of Russian governments to the risk of mass unemployment; a sensitivity that, 
paradoxically, has likely been heightened by the absence of an unemployment insurance 
programme offering reasonable replacement rates.  
To get a sense of why employment and, in particular, employment concentration has 
mattered, it should be noted that pre-transition, in 1989, with the exception of the wider 
region around Moscow, between 25-75% of industrial employment in each region was 
concentrated in industries that had four or fewer firms in that region (Brown, Ickes and 
Ryterman, 1994). Further, even when a plurality of firms was operating in a locality, 
these were often within the same sector, resulting in many local economies being 
dependent on one particular industry.  
This legacy has not been quick to wither away. A recent estimate has suggested that one-
company towns — particularly severe instances of employment concentration that were 
commonly created for strategic, military or economies-of-scale reasons — still exceed 
400 and account for over 12% of Russia’s population.
2  Low labour mobility within 
Russia has further impeded restructuring of these entities and tended to sustain these loci 
of employment concentration.  These in turn have continued to attract public resources 
with the specific purpose of stabilising employment, as well as maintaining some of the 
benefits that these firms have provided in lieu of local government (Commander and 
Jackman, 1997). Put simply, the inherited employment distribution has materially 
affected the allocation of resources. Firms with concentrated employment have been able 
to lobby various levels of government due to the latters’ sensitivity to raising open 
unemployment rates, particularly given large spatial mismatch between job vacancies and 
workers.
3 This trend has been associated with the related growth in the size of the state 
                                                 
2 Institute for Social Policy, cited by Bloomberg, 27 May, 2010. 
3 We will be able to look at this in more empirical detail in a later version of the paper using newly 
available RosStat data that reports subsidies by region and sector for recent years. An instance of this 
sensitivity is Pikalyovo, a town of around 23,000 inhabitants with two large cement plants where a strike in 
2009 led to a visit by the Prime Minister and a promise of investment.   4
and, in particular, by the growth in government consumption; phenomena driven in much 
of the last decade by the explicit aim of putting the public sector at the heart of the 
economy.  
This paper looks at whether performance of one-company town enterprises in Russia is 
consistent with this hypothesis. Certainly, the predicament of one-company towns has 
often been in the media spot light. However, this could be because the situation of these 
towns epitomizes the problems of the Russian industry in general and these enterprises 
are in fact no different from firms elsewhere in the economy. However, our empirical 
comparison of production functions of enterprises reveals that one-company town 
enterprises tend to be characterised by significantly lower marginal products of labour 
and significantly higher marginal products of capital, suggesting substantial labour 
hoarding. These effects manifest themselves not only in cross-section but also in a panel 
setting controlling for enterprise fixed effects, suggesting that productivity differentials 
have been widening. In addition, there is also evidence that overall productivity is 
substantially lower in one-company-town firms. Finally, the latter are also found to be 
more indebted, and hence more financially vulnerable, than comparable enterprises 
located elsewhere, although the economic magnitude of differentials in indebtedness was 
not as high as that of differentials in the marginal products of labour and capital. 
Taken together, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis that natural resource 
dependence and employment concentration reinforce one another. Commodity revenues 
make it possible to sustain less efficient enterprises in areas with concentrated 
employment. In turn, this impedes restructuring in the manufacturing sector and 
improvements in competitiveness, further locking in dependence on commodity 
revenues. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II discusses the implications of a 
resource boom for allocation of resources and the interaction between resource-
dependence and inherited employment concentration structures that may reinforce each 
other. Section III provides an empirical analysis of enterprise performance in one-
company towns in Russia. A conclusion follows.   5
2. Resource Allocation and One-Company Towns 
2.1. Resource allocation with a booming sector 
Chart 1 plots the evolution of the oil price
4 and the real exchange rate for Russia since the 
mid-1990s. Oil prices have oscillated sharply—from a low of under $9 per barrel of Urals 
in late 1998 to a peak of $138 in mid-2008, before falling to a trough of $35 per barrel in 
the same year. By 2010, prices had rebounded to a range of $75-85 per barrel. The chart 
also shows that since the early 2000s there has been a very strong appreciation of the 
exchange rate that was inflected only to a very limited extent at the height of the crisis in 
2008-09. Clearly, Russia has been characterised by a booming natural resource sector that 
has affected relative prices.  
















































































































Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, World Development Indicators and authors' calculations. 
Oil price is expressed in real terms (2008 prices) using US CPI.
REER, 2005 = 100
Oil price, US$ per barrel (2008 prices)
 
In a general equilibrium setting with non-traded and traded goods, the price of the former 
will be determined endogenously through domestic supply and demand and the latter be 
determined exogenously, with equilibrium occurring through adjustment of the price of 
the non-traded good relative to the traded good, the inverse being the real exchange rate 
(Salter, 1959; Corden, 1984). A booming natural resource price can induce resource 
allocation effects as excess demand for non-traded goods leads to real exchange rate 
                                                 
4 Gas prices have tended to follow oil quite closely over most of this period.   6
appreciation. In addition, spending on non-tradables can raise their relative price. Both 
channels can affect the composition of output by raising the share of non-traded output in 
total output.  However, any such shifting of resources into non-tradables may lower long 
run-growth on account of differences in productivity (Van Wijnbergen, 1984; Sachs and 
Warner, 2001). In short, an increase in the relative price of natural resources, as well as 
the fact that a part of the revenues from the booming sector will be directly spent on non-
traded goods, can affect the dynamic structure of production. These effects could occur in 
the absence of any political economy considerations. However, as the bulk of revenues 
from the booming sector in Russia has accrued to government, given its (increasing) 
ownership and control of the natural resource sectors, political economy considerations 
are also likely to have been important. 
Decomposing spending across tradables and non-tradables is always difficult, not least 
given data organisation and limitations. In Russia, this is accentuated due to the gap 
between notional and actual tradability; a legacy of the Soviet past.
5 Nevertheless, there 
are several indicators that we can use. Chart 2 gives the evolution of government size 
using two measures, the national and fiscal accounts. Government size according to the 
more inclusive fiscal measure increased sharply from around 27% of GDP in 2000 to 
40% by 2009 while simultaneously accounting for around quarter of aggregate 
consumption. The growing wedge between the fiscal and national accounts estimates of 
the size of government reflects the rising importance of transfers recorded both as budget 
expenditure and private consumption. 
                                                 
5 Specificity in clients and suppliers also contributed to the scale of output contraction that occurred 
following the demise of the Soviet Union. See Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Ickes (2008).   7











2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
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2.2. Political economy  
Part of the increase in government size can be attributed to the expansion of public 
employment; government employment at federal, regional and municipal levels grew by 
over 35% between 1998-2000 and 2007-09. Chart 3 amplifies the point regarding the 
importance of public sector employment. Although the share of state and mixed 
ownership firms that were legal entities in total firms was around 11%, employment in 
state and mixed firms was almost 40% in 2007.
6 A sectoral breakdown would show some 
preponderance of state ownership in energy and natural resource sectors but also a 
significant presence in manufacturing and chemicals, among other sectors. Given that 
government and social services, health and education accounted for around 25% of total 
employment at this time, it is evident that the public sector has remained large. In short, 
resource allocation effects towards non-tradables seem to have been significant.  
                                                 
6 Calculated as firms and organisations including commercial firms, non-commercial organisations and 
state institutions registered as legal entities, see Sprenger (2008).   8
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Sources: RosStat and authors' calculations. 
 
Further, employment-motivated spending has been wider. Although explicit subsidies to 
the entire firm sector have remained small — in the range of 2-5 percent of GDP — this 
does not capture the full scale and scope of public transfers. The fiscal stimulus package 
of 2009-2010 had a combination of social spending and support to large firms that 
accounted for the largest share of the package, amounting to over 3% of GDP. Declared 
spending on one-company towns alone in 2010 has been initially put at around $900 
million.
7 In addition, in 2009 the government had set up a working group on one-
company towns whereby one-company towns can submit redevelopment programmes 
and applications for federal co-financing of various investment projects ranging from 
infrastructure to capital stock modernisation. By end-2010 around 50 comprehensive 
investment plans had been agreed. All of this suggests that the firm sector and, perhaps 
particularly, those with concentrated employment have received significant support from 
government or government controlled institutions.  
The impact of high natural resource prices on an economic structure characterised already 
by low productivity, as well as the persistence of non-market based criteria for resource 
allocation, is also likely to have political economy dimensions.  At its most simplistic, the 
median voter over time may have increasingly come to resemble a public sector worker. 
                                                 
7 Speech of the Russian Prime Minister, May 20, 2010   9
Yet the classic median voter model does poorly in linking median preferences to policy 
outcomes and, in the Russian instance, would additionally have to be qualified by the 
institutional parameters that have surely affected how preferences have been aggregated 
or indeed have mattered as pluralistic electoral behaviour appears to have been 
diminished over the reference period.
8 Yet even though this point seems relevant, the 
government — federal and sub-national — has clearly remained very sensitive to 
economic performance (as indicated by the size and configuration of the stimulus 
programme of 2009-10) and to employment (as indicated by the presence and size of the 
one-company town programmes). This has influenced the direction and composition of 
public spending, as commodity rents have been realised. Economic policy and public 
spending have aimed to raise general living standards through growth
9 and, at the same 
time, achieve some redistribution in order to limit unemployment and social unrest.
10 The 
latter risk, as already mentioned, has been accentuated by the inheritance of concentrated 
employment and labour market inefficiencies, notably spatial mismatch.  
We argue that the way in which the resource rents have been allocated in Russia has been 
affected by the inherited configuration of output and employment as well as by the 
motivation of politicians. Incumbent politicians can acquire an incumbency advantage by 
using a permanent increase in natural resource rents to ‘buy’ support through generating 
employment in the public sector.
11  But how politicians allocate those resources may also 
lead to severe mis-allocation both on account of the scale of support buying or through 
the way in which it is channelled. In the Russian case, the latter seems particularly 
relevant, not least because public employment is generally inefficient. Further, the 
adverse effects of resource rent allocations have also been found to be larger where 
                                                 
8 For example, the Heritage or Polity IV political indicators both describe a decline in democratic status. 
9 See, for example, the declared objectives of government economic policy in the immediate aftermath of 
the 2008 crisis. 
10 This relates to the wider literature as to whether natural resources tends to be associated with 
authoritarian political behaviour or whether dominance of natural resources is more a reflection of political 
authoritarianism. See, inter alia, Acemoglu, Robinson and Verdier (2006).  
11 For a model that links politics, natural resources and institutions, see Robinson, Torvik and Verdier 
(2006). The incumbency bias arises because the incumbent can credibly determine employment in advance.    10
political and other institutions are weak and limit transparency
12. Institutional integrity 
and capacity in Russia, under most measures, has been low and often declining in the 
recent past.  
In this framework, the next sections offer an empirical test of whether enterprises in one-
company towns have been less efficient, suffered from relative resource misallocations 
and have been financially more vulnerable (in terms of their levels of indebtedness) 
compared with enterprises in more diversified localities. We find support for these 
hypotheses. It is preceded by a short overview of economic literature on one-company 
towns. 
2.3 One-company towns: an overview 
Although one-company towns are often associated with centrally planned economies, 
they were in fact common elsewhere. One-company towns had grown up in the USA 
towards the end of the 19
th century, particularly in the industrial areas of the Mid-West
13, 
and at their peak were over 2,500 in number, accounting for up to 3% of the US 
population. In the UK, the Cadbury company town of Bourneville and Lord Lever’s Port 
Sunlight were the best known examples. They reflected a paternalistic motivation by their 
employers towards their workers (Green, 2010; Solecki, 1996). But other one-company 
towns, particularly in the mining industry, were characterized by less benign conditions, 
being driven primarily by geographic considerations (Fishback and Lauszus, 1989, for 
US; Gibson (1990) for Australia).  
One-company towns became particularly widespread in the Soviet Union. This reflected 
a combination of size—the vast land mass—relatively low population density, and 
significant deposits of various natural resources, often located in areas with very 
inhospitable climate (e.g., Norilsk). In part, it also reflected the preference of central 
planners for scale economies and low input (energy) prices. Finally, a significant number 
of large industrial enterprises were moved further east from their historical locations 
                                                 
12 See Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006). 
13 Pullman, Ohio, built for the 6,000 employees of George Pullman’s railway company, and McDonald, 
Ohio, created by Carnegie Steel Company are prominent examples. See Buder (1967) for an overview.   11
during the Second World War. Many of them remained in their new locations — 
locations chosen precisely for reasons of poor accessibility.  
The economic literature on one-company town enterprises is relatively modest. Rama and 
Scott (1999) have looked at incomes in one-company towns in Kazakhstan, where mono-
towns were also common, using data from the 1996 living standards survey and found 
that labour earnings in a town decreases by approximately 1.5 per cent when the share of 
its population working for the anchor company decreased by 1 per cent. This could be 
interpreted as evidence of leverage of one-company enterprises during the early years of 
transition.  Commander and Jackman (1997) looked at the incidence of non-monetary 
compensation in transition firms, including one company and one industry towns, and 
showed how the dependence of local public services on the viability of a firm or industry 
was a serious structural defect in the system of local government finance.  
3. Empirical Analysis 
3.1. Data 
To identify enterprises in one-company towns and assess their relative performance the 
analysis below uses the Orbis database of Russian enterprises collected by Bureau van 
Dijk over the period 2003–08. The database provides annual information on majority of 
Russian firms covering basic balance sheet aggregates, total employment, industry 
affiliation, and enterprise location. The panel is unbalanced and coverage generally 
improves over time. Table 1 summarizes the basic descriptive statistics for selected 
variables for companies employing more than 25 employees. The table is based on data 
for 2007. In addition - and for comparison purposes - the lower part of the table includes 
a summary for some of the variables used in the analysis for the monotown companies.    12
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for selected variables 
Variable  Mean St. dev. Median Min Max k var
Overall
Production variables (in thousands of US dollars, unless otherwise indicated)
Operating revenue (turnove 15,100 143,300 2,109 1 6,094,733 949.0
Employment (persons) 200 793 59 25 31,441 395.8
Total assets 12,597 129,980 1,225 2 4,986,583 1,031.9
Fixed assets 6,141 76,789 244 1 2,855,421 1,250.3
Total assets per employee 44.9 333.6 16.7 0.0 25,151.8 742.6
Fixed assets per employee 18.7 221.8 3.4 0.0 16,896.0 1,185.3
Revenue per employee 35.5 234.9 20.5 0.0 18,949.1 661.0
Financial structure variables (in per cent, unless otherwise indicated)
Tangibility ratio 29.2 22.8 25.4 0.0 99.7 78.1
Profitability ratio 12.3 18.5 8.9 -99.7 99.9 150.4
Long-term debt-to-assets r. 6.9 16.3 0.0 0.1 99.6 236.2
Debt-to-assets ratio 18.6 23.0 8.6 0.0 99.8 123.7
One-company town enterprises (using the 5 per cent cut-off)
Production variables (in thousands of US dollars, unless otherwise indicated)
Operating revenue (turnove 129,412 492,275 13,001 3 4,098,520 380.4
Employment (persons) 1,564 3,446 466 52 31,441 220.3
Total assets 134,369 526,353 10,239 26 3,466,946 391.7
Fixed assets 79,949 343,551 3,815 1 2,799,211 429.7
Total assets per employee 50.5 132.5 22.4 0.1 1,250.3 262.3
Fixed assets per employee 27.5 98.4 7.4 0.0 1,009.5 357.4
Revenue per employee 30.5 61.4 18.6 0.0 608.7 201.3
Financial structure variables (in per cent, unless otherwise indicated)
Tangibility ratio 40.2 20.5 39.1 0.1 95.9 51.0
Profitability ratio 11.8 15.1 9.0 -42.9 72.1 128.0
Long-term debt-to-assets r. 11.1 19.3 0.0 0.0 93.3 173.9
Debt-to-assets ratio 27.4 25.6 19.7 0.0 99.8 93.4
Sources: Bureau Van Dijk, authors' calculations.
Notes: Based on year 2007; 7,080 observations for production variables (of which 177 in 
one-company towns); and 17,050 observations  for financial structure variables
 (of which 561 in one-company towns). K var is coefficient of variation (in per cent).
 
The judgement about what constitutes a one-company town - i.e. a town dominated by 
one enterprise - is inevitably subjective, as almost no town has strictly one firm operating 
in it. In this light and in order to identify enterprises that account for a large share of 
employment in their respective locations, the population data were matched for each 
town using the 2002 population Census results published by the Office of Statistics   13
(RosStat).
14 Thus, each mining and manufacturing enterprise can be characterized in 
terms of the share of the local population it employs. In the absence of detailed data on 
demographics and employment structure in each town it is necessary to make a 
judgement on what share of population employed by an enterprise will qualify it as a 
monotown enterprise. Back-of-envelope estimates, as well as some prominent examples 
of one-company towns, suggest a threshold of around 5 per cent. On average, the 
employment-to-population ratio in Russia is around 48 per cent and has been broadly 
stable over years and across regions. Most people are employed in services, 
manufacturing accounts for 16.5 per cent of total employment, and mining for additional 
1.5 per cent. Thus, on average manufacturing and mining employ around 8.5 per cent of 
population. Services tend to be concentrated in large and coastal cities, and agriculture in 
rural areas, implying that manufacturing-oriented one-company towns will have a much 
higher share of population employed in manufacturing and mining. Nonetheless, services 
(including government and social services, education, health care, real estate, 
construction) are still likely to account for around two thirds of employment. Thus an 
enterprise employing 5 per cent of the population is likely to account for more than a 
third of employment in core industries (manufacturing and mining) while a 
manufacturing enterprise employing 10 per cent of the population will almost certainly 
dominate the economy of the locality and the livelihood of its people. 
These thresholds also seem to be consistent with cases of one-company enterprises that 
have made headlines in Russia since 2008-09. For example, a 16,000 population city - 
Baikalsk in Irkutsk Region – came to prominence for environmental and social 
considerations. The livelihood of the majority of population depends on a single 
enterprise, a paper factory built in the 1960s, which is a major polluter situated on the 
banks of the world's largest fresh water lake. Before the suspension of activity in 2008 
the factory employed around 2,300 people or 14 per cent of the population. After 
numerous protests, the government granted the factory exemption from ecological 
                                                 
14 The Census provides population figures individually for all towns with a population over 3,000 people as 
well as for smaller towns and villages in less densely populated areas.    14
standards applied around the Baikal Lake and production has resumed. The town was 
also included in the mono-town assistance federal programme.   
Avtovaz, the giant car maker which employed around 100,000 people and had to be 
bailed out by the federal government when demand for passenger cars dropped sharply at 
the height of the crisis, accounts for a similar share of the population in Togliatti, a 
700,000+ city in the Samara Region. Although Togliatti is much larger than Baikalsk and 
is not a single industry city in strict sense – it is home to Russia’s biggest ammonia 
manufacturer and a major dairy factory – Avtovaz is absolutely central to the local 
economy. 
Pikalyovo, a 23,000 population town in Leningrad Region became widely known in June 
2009 when employees of three local enterprises blocked the St. Petersburg-Vologda 
highway demanding that wage arrears be cleared and job security ensured
15. The 
enterprises are closely interlinked, having been part of one cement production chain, 
however, the cement factory alone, which employed around 800 people, falls short of the 
5 per cent of population threshold. Nonetheless, together, the related enterprises employ 
over 10 per cent of the population and effectively determine the fortunes of this one-
industry town. 
In similar vein, the World Bank (2010) highlights the case of Dalnegorsk, a remote town 
in the Russian Far East with a population of 40,000 people. The local economy is 
underpinned by two enterprises, Dalpolimetal, a zinc producer founded in 1897 and 
employing 2,000 people, and Bor, a boric acid producer founded in 1958 and employing 
over 3,400 people (both Dalnegorsk firms clear the 5 per cent threshold but neither 
employs more than 10 per cent of town’s population). Both enterprises are in a difficult 
financial situation, and diversification options for the city are constrained by its very 
remote location. 
The definition of one-company town enterprise as one that employs over 5 per cent of the 
population seems to accommodate these recent high-profile cases. A stricter 10 per cent 
                                                 
15 A notable piece of political theatre followed in which the Prime Minister on camera berated the owner of 
the plant, the oligarch, Deripaska. That did not, however, stop the latter’s Basic Element being a major 
recipient of public support in the crisis.   15
threshold can also be applied. The key limitation of both definitions is the possibility that 
an enterprise is split vertically along the value added chain into separate independent 
enterprises and none of the components clear the definition threshold or, conversely, that 
the accounts of the enterprise are consolidated into a nation-wide industrial group which 
owns different production facilities. While both consolidation and disaggregation cases 
can be found in the data, they do not seem to be widespread. 
Finally, to avoid a situation where enterprises around the 5 per cent threshold switch their 
status from year to year, maximum employment over the period 2003-08 is used to assign 
the one-company town status. 
3.2. One-company town enterprises in the data 
Overall, the list of one-company enterprises (using the 5 per cent cut-off) comprises 868 
firms with wide dispersion across regions and industries, of which 392 companies also 
clear the 10 per cent threshold. This list is not comprehensive as it is subject to 
disaggregation and consolidation caveats, and a number of relevant firms may not feature 
in the Orbis database or may not have their employment or industry recorded correctly, as 
Orbis covers around 84 per cent of manufacturing and mining employment reported and 
assigned to individual industries in RosStat yearbooks. Nonetheless, it is likely to provide 
a close first approximation of reality.  
Table 2 shows that one-company town enterprises account for over 17 per cent of overall 
employment in mining and manufacturing. They are particularly prevalent in the 
industrial core of Russia - the Urals Federal District - where they employ every third 
manufacturing and mining worker. In terms of industry breakdown (Table 3), mining 
comes first with roughly half of employment concentrated in one-company town 
enterprises. This is intuitive, as mining towns tend to grow for specific purpose of 
minerals extraction and remain undiversified economic localities in often remote areas.  
One-company town enterprises also account for 31 per cent of employment in vehicle 
manufacturing; 23 per cent in metals; 17 per cent in petrochemicals and 15 per cent in 
wood processing and paper manufacturing. Coincidentally, the examples mentioned 
above cover all these industries. But even in light industry, a non-negligible share of   16
employment is accounted for by one-company towns (up to 10 per cent in the textile 
sector). 





towns with 10 
percent cut-off
One-company 





Urals 346,563 458,987 1,076,459 1,260,154
Volga 342,359 580,781 1,948,471 2,622,974
North West 121,698 143,932 898,321 1,061,758
Central 142,794 347,498 2,780,811 2,857,005
Far East 30,235 36,616 218,918 324,615
Siberia 73,305 109,315 852,271 1,222,721
South 16,576 28,217 601,995 884,242
TOTAL 1,073,530 1,705,346 8,377,246 10,233,469
Federal 
district
OCT (5%) in per 
cent of dataset 
employment
Dataset in % of 
RosStat 
employment
OCT (5%) in per 
cent of RosStat 
employment
OCT (10%) in 
per cent of 
RosStat 
Urals 42.6 85.4 36.4 27.5
Volga 29.8 74.3 22.1 13.1
North West 16.0 84.6 13.6 11.5
Central 12.5 97.3 12.2 5.0
Far East 16.7 67.4 11.3 9.3
Siberia 12.8 69.7 8.9 6.0
South 4.7 68.1 3.2 1.9
TOTAL 20.4 81.9 16.7 10.5
Sources: RosStat, Bureau Van Dijk, authors' calculations. Rosstat total
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towns with 10 
percent cut-off
One-company 
towns with 5 
percent cut-off
Dataset total RosStat total
Manufacturing 664,983 1,228,399 7,364,325 9,258,943
Vehicles 202,179 358,075 772,839 1,147,900
Metals 132,882 264,028 1,105,241 1,153,700
Petrochemicals 79,018 153,709 806,253 931,300
Wood and paper 74,584 119,018 599,451 739,400
Minerals 50,665 81,917 511,682 675,000
Textile 34,225 47,445 301,259 509,900
Food 57,167 106,267 1,388,482 1,456,500
Electronics 14,270 36,543 851,200 905,700
Machinery 7,936 43,276 848,098 1,108,600
Other manufacturing 12,057 18,121 179,820 630,943
Mining 408,547 476,947 1,012,921 974,526
Oil and gas 125,896 142,087 270,229 619,400
Other mining 282,651 334,860 742,692 355,126
TOTAL 1,073,530 1,705,346 8,377,246 10,233,469
Industry OCT (5%) in per 
cent of dataset 
employment
Dataset in % of 
RosStat 
employment
OCT (5%) in per 
cent of RosStat 
employment
OCT (10%) in 
per cent of 
RosStat 
Manufacturing 16.7 79.5 13.3 7.2
Vehicles 46.3 67.3 31.2 17.6
Metals 23.9 95.8 22.9 11.5
Petrochemicals 19.1 86.6 16.5 8.5
Wood and paper 19.9 81.1 16.1 10.1
Minerals 16.0 75.8 12.1 7.5
Textile 15.7 59.1 9.3 6.7
Food 7.7 95.3 7.3 3.9
Electronics 4.3 94.0 4.0 1.6
Machinery 5.1 76.5 3.9 0.7
Other manufacturing 10.1 28.5 2.9 1.9
Mining 47.1 103.9 48.9 41.9
Oil and gas 52.6 43.6 22.9 20.3
Other mining 45.1 209.1 94.3 79.6
TOTAL 20.4 81.9 16.7 10.5
Sources: RosStat, Bureau Van Dijk, authors' calculations. Rosstat total is based on 2007 data.  
3.3. Empirical analysis: Enterprise performance 
To assess whether performance of one-company town enterprises is systematically 
different from enterprises elsewhere, simple production functions can be considered 
relating total output to capital stock, labour, and industry and location characteristics. 
Consider the following specification:   18
yit = α1i + β1kit + γ1lit + δt + εit         (R1) 
where  y  is logarithm of total turnover (the best available proxy for total sales), k is 
logarithm of capital stock (fixed assets), l is logarithm of the number of employees (in 
full-time equivalents), δ are fixed year effects, subscript i denotes enterprise and subscript 
t denotes year. All sales and balance sheet variables are expressed in US dollars in 
constant prices using GDP deflators adjusted for exchange rate fluctuations. 
In fixed effects regressions, which control for time-invariant characteristics of 
enterprises, the status of one-company town enterprises will be part of the fixed effect 
and cannot be identified separately. However, differences in marginal products of labour 
and capital (slope coefficients of kit and lit) between one-company town enterprises and 
other firms can be identified using the following augmented specification: 
yit = α2i + β2kit + β3kit*Di + γ2lit + γ3lit* Di + δt + εit         (R2) 
where Di is a dummy variable for one-company town enterprises using a 5 per cent (or 
alternative) threshold. Coefficient β3 shows additional marginal product of capital in one-
company towns relative to enterprises elsewhere, while coefficient γ3 shows difference in 
labour productivity between one-company town enterprises and other firms. 
Table 4 shows results of fixed effects estimation for all manufacturing (and mining) firms 
in the sample with 25 employees or more. Column A reports results for a basic 
production function of the type (R1), in column B interaction terms between capital and 
one-company town enterprise and labour and one-company town enterprise are added. 
Further columns report results of several robustness checks. In Column C mining 
companies are included alongside manufacturing companies, and in Column D total 
assets substitute for fixed assets. The key results remain unaffected.  
There are a few empirical regularities that emerge from the fixed effects analysis. Most 
importantly, the coefficients on the interaction term between labour and one-company 
town dummy is negative and significant, while the interaction term between proxies for 
capital and the one-company town dummy is positive and significant. These results are 
indicative of labour hoarding in one-company towns and/or underinvestment in capital 
stock and technological modernisation. As a robustness check, we include a similar table   19
(Annex Table A1) which uses a one-company town dummy set at a higher threshold (10 
percent). The results with respect to the coefficients of labour and capital remain 
unaffected, however the interaction terms mostly lose their significance (only the 
interaction term between employment and the one-company town in Column C is 
significant, albeit at a 10 percent level of significance). 
The coefficient of the interaction term between employment and one-company town 
dummy is negative and significant, suggesting that a 10 percent increase in employment 
in one-company town companies is associated with an approximately 1.5 percentage 
points lower increase in output than at other comparable enterprises. As mentioned 
above, the sign of the interaction term is also indicative of possible labour hoarding in 
these types of companies. On the other hand, an increase in capital in one-company towns 
is associated with a 1.5 or 3 percent higher increase in output compared with peers 
elsewhere (depending whether fixed or total assets are used as proxies for capital).  This 
could be an indication of possible underinvestment in capital stock and technological 
modernization.
16 
                                                 
16 To check if the results for one-company town enterprises merely reflect the fact that one-company town 
enterprises tend to be large, robustness checks also included specifications with dummy variables for other 
large enterprises (those employing more than 500 people or more than 1,000 people) and the respective 
interaction terms with measures of labour and capital. The effects specific to one-company towns persist. In 
addition, the estimation provides some evidence of labour hoarding and lower marginal product of labour 
in large companies. The results are available upon request.   20
Table 4. Production functions: Fixed effects estimation 
Dependent variable: Operating revenue, log
Fixed effects A BCD
Employment, log .878*** (.012) .880*** (.012) .887*** (.012) .764*** (.011)
Fixed assets, log .197*** (.007) .195*** (.007) .198*** (.006)
Total assets, log .411*** (.009)
Log employment * OCT -.143* (.082) -.169** (.070)  -.117 (.084)
Log fixed assets * OCT .169* (.094) .150* (.079)
Log total assets * OCT .330*** (.124)
Constant 2.247*** (.055) 2.238*** (.055) 2.202*** (.054) 1.014*** (.058)
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 56,332 56,332 61,196 63,027
Number of groups 19,179 19,179 20,981 20,950
R² 0.61 0.61 0.62 0.66
Notes: Estimated by fixed effects, robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
variables are expressed in real terms using GDP deflators. Sample includes 
manufacturing firms employing 25 people or more, 2003-08. OCT is one-company 
town enterprise dummy (using 5 per cent cut-off). *** indicates significance
at 1 the per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level, and * at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Fixed effects estimation may understate productivity problems in one-company towns as 
the time-invariant (systematic) component of lower output of these enterprises, if any, 
will be subsumed by enterprise fixed effects. A complementary approach would be to 
focus on cross-enterprise dimensions of the dataset and analyse the between effect 
estimates of productivity. Between effects estimation exploits differences in average 
output over a certain period of time (2006-08 in this case) and differences in time 
averages of the explanatory variables.
17 Specification (R3) is a cross-sectional adaptation 
of specification (R2): augmented with industry dummies (at two-digit level), federal 
district dummies, as well as a dummy variable for one-company town enterprises 
(denoted Xi).  
yit = α3 + β4kit + β5kit*Di + γ4lit + γ5lit* Di + σDi + λXi + ηit     (R3) 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the between effects estimation. Column A reports 
coefficients of a basic production function, which is augmented with one-company 
                                                 
17 For cross-sectional analysis the sample was restricted to the sub-period of 2006-08 as data availability for 
the earlier period (2003-05) is relatively poor. The results generally hold if the entire period of 2003-08 is 
considered.    21
enterprise dummy and the corresponding interaction terms in Column B. As expected, the 
implied differences in productivity between one-company town enterprises and other 
firms become larger. Firstly, the one-company town dummy is negative and significant, 
and its magnitude is far higher than those of the industry or regional dummy. In 
quantitative terms, it suggests that the output of a one-company town enterprise is up to 
70 per cent lower compared with its peers, other things being equal.
18 Coefficients on the 
interaction terms suggest that the marginal product of labour is lower and marginal 
product of capital is higher in one-company town enterprises and these effects are 
statistically and economically significant. These results are indicative of labour hoarding 
in one-company towns and/or underinvestment in capital stock and technological 
modernisation. As a robustness check we include an annex table (Annex Table A2) which 
uses a higher threshold one-company town dummy (10 percent). The one-company town 
dummy is still negative and significant, with comparable magnitude to the one at the five 
percent threshold. In addition, the coefficients on the interaction terms are broadly the 
same in terms of sign and magnitude (however, the interaction term between the one-
company town dummy and employment loses its significance across all models). 
The coefficient of the interaction term suggests that an increase of employment by 10 
percent in the one-company town companies is associated with an average of 3 
percentage points lower increase in output compared with other enterprises. Similarly, an 
increase in capital in one-company towns is associated with a 3 percentage points higher 
increase in output. Just as in the fixed effects estimations above, the results suggest 
possible labour hoarding and underinvestment in capital taking place in one-company 
towns. 
                                                 
18 Logarithmic transformation implies that the coefficient σ of the one-company town dummy variable 
corresponds to the term e
σ in multiplicative production function of Cobb-Douglas type. For instance, the 
coefficient of -1.2 corresponds to a multiplicative term of 0.3.    22
Table 5. Production functions: Cross-section analysis 
Dependent variable: Operating revenue, log
Between effects ABCDE
Employment, log 0.891 0.904 0.916 0.917 0.608
(.010)*** (.011)*** (.010)*** (.010)*** (.010)***
Fixed assets, log 0.121 0.119 0.109 0.118
(.005)*** (.005)*** (.004)*** (.004)***
Total assets, log 0.414
(.006)***
Log employment * OCT -0.280 -0.251 -0.231 -0.209
(.084)*** (.085)*** (.067)*** (.085)**
Log fixed Assets * OCT 0.337 0.350 0.280
(.052)*** (.053)*** (.041)***
Log total Assets * OCT 0.329
(.063)***
OCT -1.199 -1.508 -1.074 -2.005
(.423)*** (.426)*** (.351)*** (.434)***
Constant 2.526 2.495 2.558 2.493 1.592
(.072)*** (.073)*** (.037)*** (.048)*** (.066)***
Regional dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of observations 28,511 28,511 28,511 30,954 31,631
Number of groups 13,385 13,385 13,385 14,602 14,751
R²  0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.64
Notes: Estimated by the between estimator, robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
variables are expressed in real terms using GDP deflators. Sample includes 
manufacturing firms employing 25 people or more, 2006-08. OCT is one-company 
town enterprise dummy (using 5 per cent cut-off). *** indicates significance
at 1 the per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level, and * at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Columns C, D, and E report the results of several robustness checks. In Column C 
industry and regional dummies are dropped; in Column D mining firms are included 
alongside manufacturing enterprises; and in Column E total assets substitute for fixed 
assets.
19  
                                                 
19 When dummy variables for other large companies are included separately or jointly with one-company 
town dummies, the differentials in marginal products of labour and capital for one-company town 
enterprises prove to be much stronger than for large companies overall.   23
3.4. Empirical analysis: Indebtedness and financial vulnerability 
The analysis above suggests that the problems of one-company town enterprises are not 
merely problems of an average Russian enterprise put in the spotlight because of its 
significance in the local economy. They appear to be compounded by even greater labour 
hoarding, lack of restructuring, and hence lower productivity. A related question is 
whether these enterprises are also more indebted and more financially vulnerable than 
their counterparts in more diversified local economies.  
Following Rajan and Zingales (1995) the basic specification (R4) explaining 
indebtedness of a firm (ratio of debt to total assets, Dd) includes a measure of tangibility 
(the ratio of fixed assets to total assets, Tng), firm size (in terms of employment or 
turnover, Size), profitability (the return on assets, Prf) and industry affiliation and region 
(X): 
Ddit = αit + βTngit + γSizeit + µPrfit + σDi + λXi + νit     (R4) 
Tangibility is expected to be positively associated with debt-to-assets ratio as more 
capital-intensive firms can offer better collateral on the one hand and tend to require more 
external financing for investment projects on the other. Size is also expected to have a 
positive effect, while the effect of profitability is ambiguous: profitable firms may have 
more opportunities to finance investments out of cash flow but they may also seek to 
expand more aggressively. In addition, specification (R4) includes a dummy variable for 
one-company town enterprises (D). As the analysis focuses on cross-firm differences in 
average indebtedness, the model is estimated using the between panel estimator 
effectively employing average indicators for each firm for the period 2006-08. 
Table 6 summarizes the results for censured Tobit regressions when the long-term debt to 
assets ratio is used as a measure of financial leverage. Column A reports the basic Rajan 
and Zingales (1995) specification augmented with the one company town dummy. 
Consistent with their analysis, the coefficients on tangibility and size are positive and 
significant, while the coefficient of profitability is negative and significant. The 
magnitude and significance of the one company town coefficient suggests that enterprises 
in one-company towns have, on average, higher long-term debt-to-assets ratios. In 
numerical terms the size of the coefficient would imply that the long-term debt to assets   24
ratio in the one-company towns is on average about 1.5 percent higher. Columns B, C, 
and D report additional model specifications. In model B, regional and sector dummies 
are introduced to the main specification, while in model C, the sample includes 
manufacturing and mining companies. Finally, in column D logarithm of revenue per 
employee is included as an additional explanatory variable. This does not affect the 
results. 
Table 6. Financial leverage: Long-term debt 
Dependent variable: Long-term debt-to-assets ratio
Tobit estimates ABCD
Tangibility .451*** (.012) .397*** (.012) .407*** (.012) .431*** (.018)
Employment, log .036*** (.002) .039*** (.002) .036*** (.002) .040*** (.003)
Profitability   -.079*** (.022)  -.071*** (.020)  -.084*** (.022)  -.064*** (.021)
OCT .054*** (.013)  .036*** (.013)  .021* (.012) .066** (.026)
Revenue per employee, log  .040*** (.003)
Constant  -.434*** (.010)  -.350*** (.021)  -.413*** (.013)  -.514*** (.032)
Regional dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 22,715 22,715 24,845 12,633
Pseudo R² 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14
Notes: Estimated by the tobit estimator using averages over 2006-08, standard errors in 
parentheses. Revenue is expressed in real terms using GDP deflator. Tangibility is the
ratio of fixed assets to total assets; profitability is EBIT-to-assets ratio. Sample includes 
manufacturing firms employing 25 people or more, 2006-08. OCT is one-company 
town enterprise dummy (using 5 per cent cut-off). *** indicates significance
at 1 the per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level, and * at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Table 7 summarizes the results when the financial leverage proxy is broader and uses the 
ratio of long-term debt and short-term debt to assets as a dependent variable. The models 
are analogous to the models in Table 6. As in the previous table, the proxies for 
tangibility and size are positive and significant, while the proxy for profitability is 
negative and significant. The magnitude of the coefficient on the one-company dummy 
suggests that the debt-to-assets ratio is about 3 percentage points higher in one-company   25
town companies, other things being equal. This coefficient is statistically significant at 
the 5 per cent level in most specifications.
20   
Table 7. Financial leverage: Long-term and short-term debt 
Dependent variable: Long-term debt-to-assets ratio
Tobit estimates ABCD
Tangibility .320*** (.010) .235*** (.010) .245*** (.010) .255*** (.014)
Employment, log .031*** (.001) .033*** (.001) .029*** (.001) .034*** (.002)
Profitability   -.180*** (.052) -.161*** (.047) -.178*** (.048)  -.141*** (.054)
OCT .070*** (.013) .047*** (.012) .027** (.011) .067*** (.022)
Revenue per employee, log  .027*** (.003)
Constant  -.093*** (.010) -.021 (.019) -.063*** (.011)  -.121*** (.025)
Regional dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 22,508 22,508 24,592 12,468
Pseudo R² 0.12 0.21 0.20 0.19
Notes: Estimated by the tobit estimator using averages over 2006-08, standard errors in 
parentheses. Revenue is expressed in real terms using GDP deflator. Tangibility is the
ratio of fixed assets to total assets; profitability is EBIT-to-assets ratio. Sample includes 
manufacturing firms employing 25 people or more, 2006-08. OCT is one-company 
town enterprise dummy (using 5 per cent cut-off). *** indicates significance
at 1 the per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level, and * at the 10 per cent level. 
 
As a robustness check, we also include two equivalent tables which use a higher 
threshold one-company town dummy (ten percent). Table A3 uses the ratio of long-term 
debt to assets as a measure of financial leverage, while in Table A4 the dependent 
variable is the ratio of the sum of long-term debt and short-term debt (loans) to total 
assets. As in Tables 6 and 7, the magnitude and significance of the main determinants of 
financial leverage remain unaffected by use of the new dummy variable. Hence, both 
tangibility and size are positive and significant across all models, while profitability is 
negative and significant. The size and magnitude of the new dummy variable are 
comparable to those in Tables 6 and 7, although its significance drops in model C in 
Table A4.   
                                                 
20 As before, the exercise was reproduced using dummy variables for large companies. The coefficients for 
monotown companies retained their sign and statistical significance, while the large company dummy 
proved to be insignificant.     26
4. Conclusion 
Our paper has explored the links between resource dependence, employment 
concentration and resource allocation. We argue that dependence on commodity rents and 
high employment concentrations – manifested in the widespread presence of one-
company towns – can interact, locking in a pattern of sub-optimal resource allocation 
while also impeding enterprise restructuring, modernisation and diversification of the 
economy. For political economy reasons, resource rents are channelled to localities with 
high employment concentration, which primarily supports labour hoarding. In turn, this 
can lead to a further decline of the non-resource sector (already affected by the change in 
relative prices and the real exchange rate). As such, the boom in natural resources in 
Russia has been associated with resource rent allocations that respect political objectives, 
notably of support buying (or perhaps, more accurately, opposition neutralising). With 
weak institutions, this has likely accentuated adverse efficiency effects.   
Empirical support for these conjectures has been marshalled in our paper by identifying 
one-company towns using a large dataset of Russian enterprises and matching enterprise 
data with Census population data for the towns in which firms are located. Our analysis 
has confirmed the significance of one-company towns more than twenty years into 
transition – they were found to account for 13 to 17 per cent of manufacturing 
employment country-wide and over a third of manufacturing employment in the Urals 
Federal District  –  the industrial core of Russia.  
Comparison of production functions of enterprises revealed that one-company town 
enterprises tend to be characterised by significantly lower marginal products of labour 
and significantly higher marginal products of capital, suggesting substantial labour 
hoarding in one-company-town firms. These effects manifest themselves not only in the 
cross-section but also in a panel setting controlling for enterprise fixed effects, suggesting 
the widening of productivity differentials. In addition, there is also evidence that overall 
productivity is substantially lower in one-company-town firms. Finally, the latter also 
were found to be more indebted, and hence financially vulnerable, than comparable 
enterprises located elsewhere, although the economic magnitude of differentials in   27
indebtedness was not as high as that of differentials in the marginal products of labour 
and capital 
Overall, the analysis suggests that employment concentration, including in its extreme 
form of one-company towns, presents specific policy challenges. In particular, it appears 
that distortionary resource allocation has been particularly acute in the case of one-
company towns. Support to loci of concentrated employment, drawing on natural 
resource rents, may have achieved some form of employment (although not earnings) 
stability and abatement of social tension but, coupled to the broader re-allocation of 
resources to public consumption, this has undoubtedly imposed costs. Further, these sorts 
of transfer policies appear to have been used as substitutes, rather than as complements, 
to other policies designed to help restructuring and reallocation, such as better policies for 
entry as well as for retraining and other measures aimed at better labour market 
performance. While allocations to one-company towns are not the largest component of 
resource rent allocations, put together with other components, the pattern that can be 
observed is one that is likely to be antithetical to diversification and accelerated growth; 
objectives that, at least notionally, have been espoused by the Russian government.   28
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Annex 
   
Table A1.  Production functions: Fixed effects estimation (10% threshold) 
Dependent variable: Operating revenue, log
Fixed effects ABCD
Employment, log .878*** (.012) .879*** (.012) .885*** (.012) .762*** (.011)
Fixed assets, log .197*** (.007) .196*** (.007) .199*** (.006)
Total assets, log .413*** (.009)
Log employment * OCT10 -.065 (.083) -.120* (.066) -.100 (.095)
Log fixed assets * OCT10 .215 (.154) .179 (.120)
Log total assets * OCT10 .231 (.188)
Constant 2.247*** (.055)2.240*** (.055)2.205*** (.053)1.030*** (.057)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 56,332 56,332 61,196 63,027
Number of groups 19,179 19,179 20,981 20,950
R² 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.68
Notes: Estimated by fixed effects, robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
variables are expressed in real terms using GDP deflators. Sample includes 
manufacturing firms employing 25 people or more, 2003-08. OCT10 is one-company
town enterprise dummy (using 10 per cent cut-off). *** indicates significance
at 1 the per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level, and * at the 10 per cent level. 
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Table A2. Production functions: Cross-section analysis, 10% threshold 
Dependent variable: Operating revenue, log
Between estimates ABCDE
Employment, log 0.891 0.898 0.911 0.912 0.603
(.010)*** (.010)*** (.010)*** (.010)*** (.010)***
Fixed assets, log 0.121 0.120 0.111 0.120
(.005)*** (.005)*** (.004)*** (.004)***
Total assets, log 0.417
(.006)***
Log employment * OCT10 -0.037 -0.021 -0.097 0.057
(.117) (.118) (.089) (.124)
Log fixed Assets * OCT10 0.222 0.238 0.252
(.068)*** (.069)*** (.053)***
Log total Assets * OCT10 0.209
(.093)**
OCT10 -2.100 -2.353 -1.951 -3.068
(.655)*** (.661)*** (.520)*** (.706)***
Constant 2.526 2.506 2.571 2.503 1.597
(.072)*** (.073)*** (.037)*** (.048)*** (.066)***
Regional dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Number of observations 28,511 28,511 28,511 30,954 31,631
Number of groups 13,385 13,385 13,385 14,602 14,751
R²  0.56 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.64
Notes: Estimated by the between estimator, robust standard errors in parentheses. All 
variables are expressed in real terms using GDP deflators. Sample includes 
manufacturing firms employing 25 people or more, 2006-08. OCT10 is one-company 
town enterprise dummy (using 10 per cent cut-off). *** indicates significance
at 1 the per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level, and * at the 10 per cent level. 
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Table A3. Financial leverage: Long-term debt, 10% threshold 
Dependent variable: Long-term debt-to-assets ratio
Tobit estimates ABCD
Tangibility .451*** (.012) .397*** (.012) .407*** (.012) .431*** (.018)
Employment, log .036*** (.002) .039*** (.002) .036*** (.001) .041*** (.003)
Profitability   -.079*** (.022)  -.071*** (.020)  -.084*** (.022)  -.064*** (.021)
OCT .069*** (.019)  .052*** (.019)  .030* (.017) .095** (.036)
Revenue per employee, log  .040*** (.003)
Constant  -.436*** (.010)  -.351*** (.021)  -.414*** (.013)  -.515** (.032)
Regional dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 22,715 22,715 24,845 12,633
Pseudo R² 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.14
Notes: Estimated by the tobit estimator using averages over 2006-08, standard errors in 
parentheses. Revenue is expressed in real terms using GDP deflator. Tangibility is the
ratio of fixed assets to total assets; profitability is EBIT-to-assets ratio. Sample includes 
manufacturing firms employing 25 people or more, 2006-08. OCT10 is one-company 
town enterprise dummy (using 10 per cent cut-off). *** indicates significance
at 1 the per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level, and * at the 10 per cent level. 
 
Table A4. Financial leverage: Long-term and short-term debt, 10% threshold 
Dependent variable: Long-term debt-to-assets ratio
Tobit estimates ABCD
Tangibility .321*** (.010) .235*** (.010) .246*** (.010) .256*** (.014)
Employment, log .032*** (.001) .033*** (.001) .029*** (.001) .034*** (.002)
Profitability   -.180*** (.052) -.161*** (.047) -.178*** (.048)  -.141*** (.054)
OCT10 .065*** (.018) .045** (.018) .019 (.016) .080** (.031)
Revenue per employee, log  .027*** (.003)
Constant  -.098*** (.010) -.024 (.019) -.065*** (.011)  -.123*** (.025)
Regional dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Sector dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 22,508 22,508 24,592 12,468
Pseudo R² 0.12 0.21 0.19 0.19
Notes: Estimated by the tobit estimator using averages over 2006-08, standard errors in 
parentheses. Revenue is expressed in real terms using GDP deflator. Tangibility is the
ratio of fixed assets to total assets; profitability is EBIT-to-assets ratio. Sample includes 
manufacturing firms employing 25 people or more, 2006-08. OCT10 is one-company 
town enterprise dummy (using 10 per cent cut-off). *** indicates significance
at 1 the per cent level, ** at the 5 per cent level, and * at the 10 per cent level. 
 